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I. INTRODUCTION
A central issue about redundancy concerns how far the exercise ofreligion is simply a form of speech that is, and should be, consti-tutionally protected only to the extent that reaches speech gen-
erally. Insofar as a constitutional analysis leaves flexibility, we have
questions about wise legislative choices. To consider these issues care-
fully, we need to have a sense of what counts as relevant speech and the
exercise of religion. That is the focus of this article.
It addresses the basic categorization of what counts as “speech” for
freedom of speech and what counts as religious exercise when each is
engaged in by ordinary individuals and private organizations. There is an
obvious overlap, but does the category or combination matter for how
state and federal governments may treat practices? Does speech just
swallow religious exercise? The most obvious form of government in-
volvement is prohibition, but favorable treatment, including financial aid,
can also matter. Of concern here are constitutional limits, acceptable and
wise legislative and administrative choices, and what the common law
provides, including what counts as a tort.
My basic claim is that, despite the large number of actual overlaps and
similar considerations, the Free Exercise Clause is not, and should not be,
seen as simply redundant under the Free Speech Clause. I provide both a
summary account of existing law, in part according to leading Supreme
Court decisions, and an analysis of what makes good sense under our
basic constitutional values. Given my view that constitutional understand-
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ing does properly evolve over time with a shift in cultural values,1 such as
the equality of women and appropriateness of same-sex marriage, I do
not see present understanding and proper understanding as completely
unrelated, but one does not simply fold into the other. My basic claims
are that, when one engages in a fairly careful analysis, the Free Speech
and Free Exercise Clause have independent significance both in respect
to existing law and what is actually sensible.
I want to note here a consideration that may affect some people’s
views, even if they are hesitant to rely on it explicitly. The perceived im-
portance of religious beliefs and practices has declined somewhat in re-
cent decades for part of the population in our country, especially some
who are highly educated. If virtually everyone thought that belief in God
was silly and that religious practices were misguided, it could make sense
for the law to evolve, so that religious exercise received no particular pro-
tection. Then the basic concept becoming heavily redundant would be
appropriate.
For two basic reasons, I think any present view of this sort is badly
misguided. The most important of these is that the majority of people in
our country do maintain religious beliefs.2 Among these is a large diver-
sity, but a high percentage are Christians of one kind or another who
believe in a loving God.3 If one thought such views were decidedly irra-
tional, one might wish to give them less significance. However, the truth
is that although scientific evolution can provide many rational answers to
the development of animals, including human beings, it cannot tell us why
anything at all exists and whether God or gods have played a key role in
that. Ordinary reason also cannot settle whether spiritual forces have an-
ything to do with personal and group development.
Given the absence of a clear, rationally dictated answer to these ques-
tions, we cannot classify basic Christian and other religious beliefs as irra-
tional. Once this is acknowledged, along with the understanding that
when both the Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment were adopted,
religious beliefs and practices were considered highly important, we have
strong reasons not to simply dismiss any protection of free exercise as
fundamentally misguided. And, of course, protecting free exercise ties to
the Establishment Clause’s premise that the government should not favor
one particular religion over others; the strength of that premise has not
diminished.
1. See KENT GREENAWALT, REALMS OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION: CORE ELEMENTS
AND CRITICAL VARIATIONS 65–68 (2018); KENT GREENAWALT, INTERPRETING THE CON-
STITUTION 374 (2015).
2. See Frank Newport, 2017 Update on Americans and Religion, GALLUP (Dec. 22,
2017), https://news.gallup.com/poll/224642/2017-update-americans-religion.aspx [https://per
ma.cc/83Q2-ELQP].
3. Without a sense of certainty about what is actually true, I see myself as falling into
this category. In recent years I have been attending Riverside Church with some regularity,
and I became a member in the fall of 2018.
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These conclusions do not themselves answer the question whether the
warranted protections of free speech and free exercise are essentially the
same. There is definitely a substantial overlap in content and in the rea-
sons for protection, but that does not tell us whether we also have some
differences in basic coverage or whether, even in some overlap circum-
stances, the same or different degrees of constitutional, statutory, and
common law protections are what now exist or are the wisest approaches.
I shall start with a basic coverage of free speech, noting many of the mat-
ters about which overlap exists. This is important because a good deal
depends on how free speech is viewed and what the ranges of its protec-
tions are. This analysis will lead to a summary both of how far all religious
exercise amounts to speech, and whether it warrants treatment different
from other speech.
II. SPEECH AND ITS PROTECTIONS
What counts as “speech,” and why does it warrant protection against
government interference? In fact, we have had fairly significant develop-
ment over time in our legal system, but I shall concentrate on present
perceptions and what makes sense. Considering what can properly be
made criminal, I often refer to the Model Penal Code, drafted by Herbert
Wechsler and approved by the American Law Institute some decades
ago.4 That obviously now has somewhat reduced practical significance,
but it was a serious effort to work things out in a clear and warranted
way. For this reason, it is helpful to look at some of its foundations re-
garding communications.5
What are the reasons to protect freedom of speech, particularly those
that reach beyond a general favoring of safeguarding individual liberty?
In reality, multiple justifications are present. Communications are a cru-
cial way in which individuals relate to each other. They are central to how
people discover the truth and develop their own autonomy. They also
have a close relation to a political order of liberal democracy. Free com-
munication allows all sorts of political views to be expressed and protects
the exposure of abuses of authority. If this subject were left completely to
government control, we could expect views favorable to the dominant
party and its outlooks to be strongly favored over those in opposition.
When we reflect on personal interactions and human autonomy, those
reasons also strongly support freedom of religious exercise, so we have a
substantial overlap in bases for protection here.
These conclusions do not tell us whether it makes a difference what
kind of speech is involved, how far that should matter for protection, and
whether religious exercise is special in some way. One obvious point here
is that, for many matters, most of us are unable to discern what assertions
4. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
5. I actually had very tangential involvement in the commentary at stages after the
Model Penal Code was approved. For a brief summary, see KENT GREENAWALT, FROM
THE BOTTOM UP 491 (2016).
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are true and which are false, at least if we put aside what most experts in
a field are asserting. This is true about many scientific claims. Although
some such claims may be obviously false, for the most part, we non-scien-
tists must rely on what experts say about matters like evolution and cli-
mate change. This does not eliminate all free speech reasons. It is still
preferable to have open discourse on such matters rather than forms of
government control.
Another current matter is communications that are designed to pro-
mote the speaker’s interests rather than reveal the truth or enhance per-
sonal interactions. An obvious example is advertising. One may conclude
that the government should have a bit more control if some advertising is
seen to promote actions that are really undesirable. We have had, for
some time in the United States, restrictions on advertising that promotes
purchases of items needed for smoking.6
I shall note here a distinction that will not be emphasized in what fol-
lows. The First Amendment protects freedom of speech and the press.
Both in terms of historical understanding and what makes good sense,
these are not completely identical, although most coverage is essentially
the same.7 One may perceive a restriction on advertising as appropriate
for the press but not for individuals, although, with modern electronic
communication, even individuals and small businesses can reach a very
wide audience.
What kinds of communications are arguably not covered by freedom of
speech, and what may be covered that varies from any ordinary commu-
nication? In the former category, a notable example is situation-altering
utterances. If a couple says “I will” in a marriage ceremony, that is not
primarily or only a communication; it is a way to alter one’s status. If the
government wants to preclude a couple from getting married, say because
one person is already married to someone else, it may effectively bar
them from saying “I will” in a marriage ceremony. Another kind of situa-
tion-altering utterance is when a boss gives a direct order of behavior to a
subordinate. That is effectively a way for the boss to get done what he has
ordered. We can easily understand why the government can forbid such
orders to commit criminal acts.
How to see agreements and promises more generally is a bit more com-
plicated. Suppose one person says to another, “I want you to promise to
steal the wallet of the man walking toward us,” and the recipient re-
sponds, “I promise to do so.” That is effectively an agreement to commit
an illegal act. It is not protected by freedom of speech. But suppose a
committed pacifist says to a fifteen-year-old nephew, “Please promise me
that you will never submit to a military draft if one exists and covers
you,” and the nephew responds, “Yes, I promise.” The nephew’s response
here realistically amounts to a present expression of opinion rather than
6. See 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (2012).
7. See GREENWALT, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 206.
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what either person would take as a binding promise, regardless of what
the nephew’s views become if and when he is actually subject to a draft.
Two points are notable about these examples. The first is that weak
imperatives such as requests and encouragements to engage in certain
behavior are a kind of intermediate category. These may be little more
than an expression of one’s hopes and outlooks, which would be pro-
tected by freedom of speech, or they may come close to polite orders. As
I explore later in respect to criminal solicitation, we have difficult ques-
tions about just how the law should treat situations in which it is hard to
draw any clear line between what rightly amounts to a properly protected
category and what does not. One cannot rely simply on the best applica-
tion of categories by those with perfect information and ideal judgment.
One needs standards that human beings, whether judges or juries, are
capable of applying appropriately.
The second point worth noting here, but explained later, is that various
situation-altering utterances can be significant in religious practice. These
may or may not warrant more protection than such utterances in ordinary
life. If they do warrant more protection, a significant question is whether
similar protection should extend to nonreligious ideological groups.
When we turn to threats, some variations are important and how the
law should handle certain threats is complicated. Freedom of speech
seems clearly related to a pure, unconditional threat. By such a threat, I
mean that given what has already happened, a person speaks that he will,
in the future, act in a certain way. For example, one man says to another
who has broken up with his sister, “One of these days when I see you, I’m
going to beat the hell out of you.” This is a statement of likely future
action and it represents one’s feelings and appraisals. It does not follow
that all such threats should be protected, but free speech definitely comes
into play.
Conditioned threats are more complicated. Such a threat may simply
indicate what I will be likely to do if you act in a certain way. For exam-
ple, “If you commit adultery in violation of your marriage to my sister, I
will never want to see you again.” As this illustration shows, some condi-
tioned threats are natural responses. But sometimes a threat may be
mainly designed to get a person to act in a certain way. We may call these
manipulative threats as compared with warning threats. If the manipula-
tive threat is to cause a harm to someone unless she commits a criminal
act, the way in which the person is induced to commit a crime can be, and
is, made criminal. It does not really fall within the realm of free speech,
although the speaker’s evaluations of the circumstances may be implicitly
expressed. Suppose the manipulative threat is to do something one has a
right to do unless the listener does something he is allowed to do. For
example, “I will disclose to your wife the affair you are having unless you
give me $5,000.” Virtually everyone agrees this form of blackmail should
be criminal, and the effort to induce behavior favorable to oneself
strongly reduces any free speech values.
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With at least nearly all of these complicated matters, we can imagine
examples of religious practices. Whether those deserve any protection be-
yond that given generally by freedom of speech is a subject we will
explore.
On the question of threats, the formulation of the Model Penal Code is
worth noting. It limits itself to threats that are generally regarded as ille-
gitimate. It also includes a broad affirmative defense that covers actors
who believe that accusations of criminal behavior they have threatened to
make, or secrets they have threatened to reveal, are true, and who have
the purpose of getting those threatened “to behave in a way reasonably
related to the circumstances.”8
Do encouragements of criminal acts raise free speech concerns? This
depends heavily on the kind of encouragement. Under the Model Penal
Code, a person is guilty of criminal solicitation if “he commands, encour-
ages or requests another person to engage in specific conduct that would
constitute such crime.”9 One possible view is that if a person encourages
the commission of a crime, that practical objective is just not reached by
freedom of speech. But this view is oversimplified in various respects.
What is involved may constitute only a minor crime. The encouragement
may not concern immediate behavior but that which the listener may pos-
sibly do in the future. The words themselves, or what they genuinely con-
vey, may be ambiguous. The expression may reflect strong feelings and
beliefs to which freedom of speech is definitely related.
In respect to minor crimes such as speeding and trespassing on govern-
ment property, suppose someone says, “That would be a good idea.”
Should he be guilty of a crime? At least with speeding, which most driv-
ers do in the United States, I believe only drivers themselves and those
with authority who directly order that would be held liable, not any pas-
senger who recommends it.
When it comes to a listener’s future behavior, suppose a man opposed
to war engagement says in a talk to a high school audience, “You young
people should not submit to a draft.” This is more an expression of a view
about appropriate disobedience than a direct encouragement of someone
to violate the law, for it concerns mainly future behavior and it does re-
flect strong feelings and beliefs.
In respect to ambiguity, suppose a speaker says, “If our president sends
soldiers abroad and some will be killed, it would be good for one of us to
respond and kill our president.” Whether the speaker really means to
encourage that assassination or has just chosen strong rhetoric would be
very hard to conclude. Another factor that is relevant for all this is that
only a small percentage of simple encouragements lead to the actual com-
mission of crimes.
8. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.5(1) (1962).
9. Id. § 5.02(1).
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All the factors we have looked at briefly generate three related kinds
of difficult questions. The first is when considerations of free speech are
important for encouragements of criminal acts. The second is when it
makes sense to have those encouragements punished. The answer here
relates both to the force of free speech values and broader concerns
about the breadth of criminal liability. The third question ties to the sec-
ond. One might think that ideally punishment should take place only
when certain criteria are met, such as a speaker’s sense of the danger and
harm in the criminal activity he suggests, but we may doubt whether any-
thing like that standard is really one juries and judges would be able to
apply, given doubts about actual facts and what exactly motivates a
speaker. These are far from simple problems. Related to all this, we have
the question of whether anything in the category of religious exercise de-
serves protection beyond what should be extended to speech more
generally.
When advice is based on disinterested evaluation, free speech concerns
clearly come into play, but some circumstances may still be dangerous
enough to warrant criminal punishment. What if all that is involved in a
person’s communication is the likelihood that it will be a reckless or neg-
ligent cause of genuine serious harm? For example, a woman addressing a
group about a police shooting of a teenager may say, “These police don’t
deserve to live. Whoever wipes them out is doing our people a favor.”
She may hope only to encourage reform of police practice, but her words
create some risk that listeners may choose to attack the police. Under the
Model Penal Code, she could be criminally liable as a “proximate cause”
if a criminal harm occurs of which she should have been aware.10 De-
pending on her awareness of the risk, she could be liable under a stan-
dard of recklessness or negligence.11 The Model Penal Code also labels a
misdemeanor of “reckless endangerment,” in which it is enough that one
recklessly places “another person in danger of death or serious bodily
injury.”12 This reaches beyond what many jurisdictions cover.
These problems all suggest that even when free speech considerations
apply to a degree, certain forms of communication may still be criminal.
Just what lines to draw in basic theory and in practical legal rules are
difficult questions. And we also have the related question of whether re-
ligious exercise should be treated as anything special here.
What is an appropriate government response when speakers are guilty
of fraud and falsehood? Generally, some of these communications may
be subject to punishment or civil liability for defamation. Nearly every-
one lies at some point in their life, so we can see that some broad protec-
tion appropriately covers at least some lies. We also have the practical
questions of whether it matters if what a person communicates is inaccu-
rate and if the person is aware of that and its significance. This has be-
10. See id. § 2.03(2)–(3).
11. Id. § 2.03(3).
12. Id. § 211.2.
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come an increasingly intense concern during the presidency of Donald
Trump. Inaccurate statements can convey negative impressions about an-
other person that cause that person harm based on the actual reactions of
listeners or on the deep emotional upset she may experience about what
has been said about her, or both. Although the Supreme Court has for
some time said that defamation lies outside the First Amendment,13 free
speech obviously has some relevance to certain situations in which people
say things that are defamatory.
Just what should be done about these communications is obviously de-
batable. I strongly believe that the extremes of absolute protection and
no protection are both badly misguided. The foreseeable harm and
speech value should matter, and the latter should include whether the
statements are made about public officials and leading figures and thus
have some relevance to how our country operates.
In respect to the relevance of what may be religious misstatements of
actual facts, the Supreme Court in the 1944 case of United States v. Bal-
lard made clear that judges and juries cannot reach the truth of religious
claims.14 In that case, the Ballards had collected millions of dollars
through representation of various powers, including the curing of dis-
eases. The Supreme Court ruled that juries should not determine the
truth or falsity of such assertions, although they can make judgments
about sincerity.15
Some forms of communication, such as insults and epithets, are de-
signed to put down individuals or groups. These can be subject to tort
liability for the “intentional infliction of mental or emotional distress,”16
and in some instances even criminal punishment. Under the Model Penal
Code, a person may be guilty of “disorderly conduct” if he purposely or
recklessly creates a risk of “public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm”
by making an “offensively coarse utterance, gesture or display” or by ad-
dressing “abusive language to any person present.”17 A person has com-
mitted “harassment” if, “with [the] purpose to harass another, he . . .
insults, taunts or challenges another in a manner likely to provoke [a]
violent or disorderly response.”18 Some kinds of insults may be particu-
larly threatening for the long term. Racial and ethnic insults are a notable
example that may justify punitive prohibitions. Whether that should be
possible for similar insults that occur within religious exercise is a signifi-
cant question.
Yet another kind of communication that raises difficult questions is
physical acts that are not speaking or writing but are undertaken to con-
vey a point of view. Parades are often an example of this, although those
13. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 301–02 (1964).
14. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87–88 (1944).
15. Id.
16. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 57–66 (5th ed.
1984).
17. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.2(1)(b) (1962).
18. Id. § 250.4(2).
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within a parade often display explicit messages. Picketing is also often
done to convey a message. Other examples are desecrating a flag or burn-
ing a draft card. It is a puzzling question how far physical acts that do not
involve ordinary means of communication should enjoy speech protec-
tion if their evident aim is conveying a message. Another example is pub-
lic nudity when that is engaged in to express some sort of idea. Obviously,
if behavior is seriously offensive to others, it will not be protected even if
the motivation is to communicate. Generally, the relevance of free speech
protection here is debated. For religious exercise, one assumes that such
behavior would at least enjoy potential protection.
We have covered a wide range of circumstances for which a serious
question is whether free speech notions apply at all and, if so, how far
they may warrant protective actions. For many of these, we can see simi-
lar practices as within religious exercise. What that alone does not tell us
is whether for such matters the degree of protection for religious exercise
should be the same or different. It also does not tell us whether when
some religious practices get protection, somewhat similar nonreligious
analogues should or should not get the same. On this latter subject, if
religious groups and their exercises receive protections that do not apply
to people generally, should these also cover groups that are created to
reflect and promote basic nonreligious ideas and purposes, such as gender
equality?
Those are all matters that are genuinely difficult to resolve. We will
explore them both in the remainder of this article.
III. DOES RELIGION WARRANT SPECIAL TREATMENT?
I shall briefly note here some possible circumstances in which religious
ideas and groups warrant treatment that need not extend to nonreligious
analogues. One of these has to do with what we might call internal dis-
crimination. In one case, the Supreme Court made clear that churches
could choose ministers according to criteria, such as excluding women
and gay people, that would otherwise constitute impermissible discrimi-
nation in most contexts.19 As is often noted, there is a nonreligious ana-
logue in which the Court allowed the Boy Scouts to preclude leaders who
were openly gay, since parts of its message to young men was that they
should not be homosexual.20 The Boy Scouts case does indicate that not
every privilege to discriminate in this way is limited to religious groups,
but it does not really resolve whether the degree of privilege and the
amount of review are, and should be, exactly the same for religious and
nonreligious organizations.
A second kind of issue involves the government favoring some groups
or ideas over others. Here, the Establishment Clause, which accompanies
the Free Exercise Clause, is key. The government is barred from favoring
19. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171,
188–89 (2012).
20. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000).
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some religious ideas and organizations over others. That strict rule, which
safeguards free exercise, does not apply to nonreligious groups, although
some forms of categorizing nonreligious organizations could offend free-
dom of speech or other principles of liberal democracy.
A third possible difference involving religious practices concerns those
that might be in serious tension with tort law principles or criminal stan-
dards. To take a tort law illustration, a person may be liable for “unrea-
sonably” intruding on the privacy of another or engaging in “outrageous”
conduct that inflicts emotional distress. Various churches engage in shun-
ning of members or former members who in some way have departed
from what the principles of the churches require. In many of these situa-
tions, the churches are calling for an outright rejection by its members
that would be tortious in typical nonreligious situations. Courts have been
divided on how far these religious practices shall be seen as protected,21
but clearly the fact that religious practices are involved has mattered for
evaluation.
Before turning to the relevance of the Free Exercise Clause, I shall
summarize a range of questions that arise in terms of freedom of speech,
ones that earlier paragraphs address. Those help to reveal just how com-
plex any proper analysis is in determining what all any particular constitu-
tional provision entails. Relevant speech deserves more protection than
individual liberty in general. We have multiple justifications for that pro-
tection. Typical speech is communication of perceived facts and values.
Protecting it can be good generally for truth discovery, human autonomy,
and individual dignity. In our liberal democracy, it can also be good for
the political order.
In respect to the coverage of free speech, whether directly by the Con-
stitution or legislative implementation, the two fundamental questions
are what counts as relevant communication and whether the bases for
protection can be outweighed by other reasons. Exactly where a particu-
lar issue fits here is not always clear, and some matters have shifted with
changing Supreme Court doctrine. For example, if someone suggests that
an audience should engage in certain criminal behavior, such as violating
a draft law, is that simply outside the range of relevant speech or, though
it falls within that range, do the reasons for punishment outweigh the
bases for protection? The categorizations and appropriate degree of pro-
tection arise in a number of contexts.
What is the status of behavior that differs from ordinary communica-
tion? Here, we have not only matters like musical performance, but more
ordinary physical acts that are designed to convey messages, such as
burning draft cards and picketing. More typical behavior whose status is
dubious involves situation-altering utterances, such as agreements, or-
21. Compare Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 819 F.2d 875, 883
(9th Cir. 1987) (permitting the practice of shunning by Jehovah’s Witnesses), with Bear v.
Reformed Mennonite Church, 341 A.2d 105, 107–08 (Pa. 1979) (demonstrating a position
favorable to a shunned former member).
2019] Speech and Exercise 407
ders, promises, and offers. One can see an agreement to carry out imme-
diate criminal behavior as not relevant speech, but a promise to violate
some law in the distant future is more complicated. Serious manipulative
threats should not be protected, but if one is deeply disturbed by an-
other’s behavior, a threat to engage in a normal response can be seen as a
natural warning that expresses one’s sense of what is appropriate. When
it comes to inaccurate statements, should protection not be granted if a
person understands he is not telling the truth or is either reckless or negli-
gent in that respect? Given that all of us at times get things wrong and the
vast majority of people occasionally say things they know are not accu-
rate, any general principle that free speech covers only accurate state-
ments of fact would be much too narrow. Intentional insults to
individuals and group epithets might be viewed as outside the range of
free speech, or more realistically as having a speech value that can be
outweighed by competing considerations.
This summary and the preceding coverage of this article indicate just
how complicated it can be to decide what the edges are of what counts as
speech for freedom of speech and when, within those boundaries, the law
may nonetheless make something criminal or tortious. The complexity of
all this bears on how far the Free Exercise Clause is redundant. As ex-
plained earlier, it is definitely not redundant if it justifies legislation that
favors religion in some way. A thoughtful approach to free exercise leads
to the conclusion that it includes some aspects of behaviors that do not
really count as “speech” and, more subtly, that the balance of considera-
tions may protect behavior that would not be protected in nonreligious
settings. One such example is when a denomination’s practices include
harsh words and penalties for members who depart from required behav-
ior; those practices may be seen as properly protected, even though they
would not be in other contexts.
A subtle question I have briefly mentioned is: how should we take the
claim that if a privilege extends to religious groups it should also be
granted to nonreligious ideological organizations? If one concludes it is,
or should be, so granted, would that make free exercise redundant? I
shall not here tackle how far this practical claim should be accepted; still,
we need to see that its doing so does not by itself render free exercise
redundant. The reason is this: if we think about the right of religious
groups to shun noncomplying members, that may lead to the conclusion
that similar treatment is warranted for nonreligious groups. Here, the
sense of what free exercise calls for could be the basis for according simi-
lar treatment to nonreligious groups. Under that analysis, free exercise
would be a basic cause for the broader treatment, not somehow “redun-
dant” and unimportant.
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IV. HOW FAR MAY THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
BE REDUNDANT?
I turn now to the question whether, in terms of how the government
treats private citizens and organizations, the Free Exercise Clause has es-
sentially been swallowed up by free speech concerns. One generalization
is clear: any idea that modern law has reached this conclusion is signifi-
cantly misguided. It rests on a misunderstanding of the case of Employ-
ment Division v. Smith22 and what has followed. The Smith Court ruled
that if a law is cast generally and is not aimed at religious practice, no free
exercise exemption is constitutionally required by judicial determina-
tion.23 But two other elements of the opinion are potentially important.
Before we explore those, it is worth mentioning that historically the use
of free speech arguments by religious groups preceded that case. Jeho-
vah’s Witnesses notably advanced such arguments in cases a few decades
earlier.24
With Justice Scalia writing the majority opinion, the Court in Smith
decided that if the use of a substance like peyote was forbidden, then a
religious group, the Native American Church, had no constitutional right
to use peyote for sacramental purposes.25 Part of the opinion’s logic was
that judges should no longer be making such a determination according
to some flexible standard like the compelling interest test. This case effec-
tively eliminated a free exercise claim, standing alone, to act not in accor-
dance with a general law, or at least virtually all general laws. What is
badly mistaken is to see this as effectively eliminating the Free Exercise
Clause as having genuine significance. One definitely cannot reach this
conclusion just because cases resting directly on such independent consti-
tutional claims have largely disappeared.
Two aspects of the Smith decision and what has followed are signifi-
cant. I shall begin with an aspect I believe is illogical in an important
respect and which has had little practical influence; I then turn to what is
of central importance. The opinion refers to earlier cases and implies that,
when a free exercise argument is joined with a contention based on an-
other constitutional provision, the hybrid bases for an exception may be
successful.26 At one level, such a possibility clearly makes sense. In some
situations, the overall basis for a form of treatment can be increased if a
claimant has two substantial reasons for it rather than only one.
What is illogical is this: if a kind of claim can with some frequency be
strong enough to produce a constitutional right when it is combined with
a different claim, how can it never be strong enough to create a right by
itself? How can a free exercise claim really matter when in combination,
22. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
23. Id. at 888–90.
24. See Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 68 (1953); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340
U.S. 268, 274 (1951).
25. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
26. See id. at 881–82.
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but always be too weak standing alone? This is not a defensible position.
This aspect of Smith has had little influence in the decades following.27 If
the previous paragraph seems harshly critical, I should mention an aspect
of majority opinions. These often include Justices who actually have
somewhat different perspectives but believe having an opinion to which a
majority subscribes is desirable. The aim to get all to join can sometimes
produce expressed views that are subject to logical critique.
I now turn to what is the important element of the case that has a good
deal to do with free exercise still mattering in our law. Justice Scalia’s
majority opinion addresses the relevance of legislation that privileges re-
ligious practices. Among the relevant passages is the following:
Values that are protected against government interference through
enshrinement in the Bill of Rights are not thereby banished from the
political process. . . . [A] society that believes in the negative protec-
tion accorded to religious belief can be expected to be solicitous of
that value in its legislation as well. It is therefore not surprising that a
number of States have made an exception to their drug laws for sac-
ramental peyote use. But to say that a nondiscriminatory religious-
practice exemption is permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not to
say that it is constitutionally required.28
Although not put explicitly, the clear implication of this language is
that the free exercise value reflected in the Constitution can sometimes,
even often, justify legislative concessions to forms of religious practice.
Congress was actually overwhelmingly unsatisfied with what the Supreme
Court had decided in Smith. In 1993, it passed the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA) which effectively reenacted the standard of re-
view that the Supreme Court had rejected as constitutionally required.
Congress announced, among other things,
(1) the framers of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of relig-
ion as an unalienable right, secured its protection in the First
Amendment to the Constitution; (2) laws “neutral” toward religion
may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere
with religious exercise; (3) governments should not substantially bur-
den religious exercise without compelling justification . . . .29
According to RFRA, the government may not substantially burden a per-
son’s exercise of religion even by a general law unless it can demonstrate
that the burden “(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental inter-
est; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.”30
The Supreme Court decided that Congress did not have the authority
27. See Steven H. Aden & Lee J. Strang, When a “Rule” Doesn’t Rule: The Failure of
the Oregon Employment Division v. Smith “Hybrid Rights Exception,” 108 PENN ST. L.
REV. 573, 600, 602 (2003).
28. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (internal citations omitted).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(1)–(3) (2012).
30. Id. § 2000bb-1(b)(1)–(2).
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to impose this standard on states,31 but it assumed both that RFRA could
apply to federal laws and that states were free to enact similar provisions.
In 2000, Congress adopted a narrower Religious Land Use and Institu-
tionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) that reached aspects of state practices
including prisons.32 The prison provision was upheld in 2005 in Cutter v.
Wilkinson.33
Although it is possible to see other constitutional bases for this legisla-
tion of Congress, the obvious authority is conferred by the Free Exercise
Clause, and what Congress has done is to reintroduce the flexible stan-
dard of review that preceded Smith. Many states have enacted similar
laws.34 What the courts are now doing in many states is applying these
statutes to a variety of situations. This is not a direct application of a
constitutional requirement, but it is an application of laws whose author-
ity in treating religion as special does rest significantly on the constitu-
tional protection of free exercise. We have no general standard to
determine which similar forms of nonreligious categorizations are accept-
able and which are not, but we do have a central ingredient of why seeing
the Free Exercise Clause as redundant is grossly misleading, especially
since the federal laws themselves adopt what were the preceding set of
standards used in free exercise cases. Plainly, free exercise claims can play
a crucial role in what are legal rights even if courts do not need to refer
directly to the constitutional clause. What I have said here is completely
consistent with what the opinion in Smith contains. Taken as a whole, that
case is far from making the Free Exercise Clause redundant.
Of course, all this does not answer what should happen in the future. If
we got to a point at which virtually everyone thought all religious ideas
and practices were silly and misguided, then the notion of singling reli-
gions out for special favorable treatment could disappear. It would follow
then that statutes like RFRA would be repealed or themselves declared
unconstitutional.
Although statutes like RFRA make concessions to religious practices
that do not extend more generally, one can imagine an argument that any
such concession must constitutionally extend to any nonreligious reason
to engage in the same behavior. We have no indication in Supreme Court
decisions that this is generally true, and the language we have noted in
Smith indicates otherwise. Just how forceful this kind of argument may be
depends on what kind of concession to practice is involved. If one is con-
sidering use of a drug in a worship service or the practice of shunning,
one may well conclude that a limit to religious practice is appropriate.
When it comes to eligibility not to submit to military service, I believe the
argument is powerful that nonreligious pacifists should be treated like
religious pacifists. Given a statute whose plain language and objective
31. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533–35 (1997).
32. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc, 2000cc-1(a) (2012).
33. 544 U.S. 709, 725 (2005).
34. See, e.g., 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/15 (2015).
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limited the right to religious pacifists, the Supreme Court interpreted it
broadly enough to reach all sincere pacifists.35
When the issue concerns government treatment of individual believers,
one religion cannot be favored or disfavored over others. This is largely a
consequence of the bar on establishment of religions, but it relates to free
exercise. Things can be a bit more complicated when we turn to govern-
ment practices themselves, since it may seem appropriate to have modest
religious practices at public ceremonies.
I do want to note one possible exception concerning the treatment of
individuals, an issue actually raised by existing practical concerns about
Muslim terrorists. If a high percentage of members of a religion are dedi-
cated to committing violent acts against outsiders, can members of that
religion be treated differently in some respect, such as entry into the
country? Putting aside differences in age and gender of those who com-
mit violence, if sixty percent of the members of a faith were terrorists and
it was nearly impossible to tell whether an individual fell within that
group, it could be reasonable to preclude members from coming to the
United States. In present circumstances, the percentage of Muslim ter-
rorists is much, much smaller and definitely should not bar Muslim immi-
gration. What may be warranted, at least for men within a certain age
range, may be a somewhat more extensive examination of background
than is used for people generally. Taking a person’s religion into account
to this limited degree can be appropriate in order to promote safety in the
country.
Is there a free speech analogue to the bar on favoring some religions
over others in the treatment of private individuals? A categorization here
could depend on the nature of the communication or the substance of
what is conveyed, or both. Thus, we can have restrictions on advertising
that do not apply to other communications; if a person directly encour-
ages criminal actions, that may be punished. When it comes to direct re-
strictions on speech, there would be many conceivable differences among
content that would not be all right for regulation. The law cannot directly
favor support for Republicans over Democrats. Whether the range of
permissible restrictions would be as limited as they are for religion is
more doubtful. And when we turn from restraint to support, favoritism
for particular views seems more acceptable. For example, I assume that
the government could provide some financial aid for groups supporting
racial equality and gay marriage, while denying similar help to those who
oppose those aspects of equal treatment. If this analysis is correct, the
restraints on favoritism are more absolute respecting religion than non-
religious advocacy that is protected by free speech.
This article has made a number of important points. There is a large
overlap between religious exercise and communication protected by free-
35. For a more detailed analysis, see Kent Greenwalt, Granting Exemptions from Le-
gal Duties: When Are They Warranted and What Is the Place of Religion?, 93 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 89, 100–02 (2016).
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dom of speech. Exactly which form of religious exercise counts as speech
is a bit complicated and debatable, but many claims by religious speakers
can be cast in terms of freedom of speech. Despite this substantial over-
lap, it is seriously misguided to perceive freedom of speech as actually
swallowing up the Free Exercise Clause. The rules against favoring one
communicative approach over another are stricter when religion is in-
volved, and, as RFRA and RLUIPA illustrate, the government remains
free to make some concessions to religious practice that do not extend to
all those who would like to do something similar for nonreligious reasons.
As the article explains, although Smith did eliminate some kinds of free
exercise claims, it definitely did not suggest that the Free Exercise Clause
was basically redundant when restrictions and benefits for private com-
munications and activities were involved.
V. A NOTABLE RECENT CASE IN WHICH OPINIONS DEALT
WITH MANY OF THESE ISSUES
In this final section, I will give a brief account of the opinions in the
significant 2018 case of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil
Rights Commission.36 My reason is this: although the majority decided
the case on a fairly narrow basis, the majority opinion and the individual
concurring opinions addressed many of the topics of this article and how
they should be dealt with. When one reflects on what these opinions
claim, one can perceive both how complicated some of these considera-
tions are and how difficult it often is to determine the proper assessments.
Although what follows could provide some insight into likely future deci-
sions by the Supreme Court, that is not the objective. It is rather to help
readers understand the issues and what considerations should matter.
In the case, Jack Phillips, the owner of a cake shop, refused to sell a
wedding cake to a same-sex couple. At a simple level, the question was
whether that violated the Colorado anti-discrimination law’s coverage of
sexual orientation. Colorado at the time did not yet recognize same-sex
marriage, and the cake was to celebrate a marriage that occurred in an-
other state. The crucial question was whether, given Phillips’s strong re-
ligious convictions that such marriage was unwarranted, he could refuse
to provide the cake. When his refusal was challenged and reviewed by
Colorado administrative agencies and courts, he claimed a free speech
right not to exercise his artistic talents against his convictions and a free
exercise right not to act contrary to his religious beliefs. These arguments
did not succeed in Colorado, but the Supreme Court, with seven votes,
held that negative comments by commissioners showed that the Commis-
sion had not been neutral about religious beliefs, and this failure under-
cut its ruling that Phillips had to provide the cake.37 Given this basis for
36. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
37. Id. at 1729–31.
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its ruling, the Court did not need to decide whether the state had legiti-
mate reasons to require providing cakes in similar settings.
Perhaps the key question for cases like this is whether someone with
religious or other objections can refuse services. In previous writing, I
have suggested that much depends on whether what is called for is direct
participation or peripheral services.38 Although the Justices have differ-
ent views about how particular circumstances should be treated, in a
broad sense, they accept this position. All of them subscribe to the view
that for ordinary goods and services after the event, it is fine if vendors
are not able to refuse on the basis that they object to a couple’s sexual
orientation or marital status.39 All of them also agree that clerics may not
be required to perform marital services to which they have religious ob-
jections.40 I have taken the position that someone asked to be the main
photographer at a wedding should be able to refuse based on religious
convictions, but those whose duties are peripheral, such as cleaning a fa-
cility, should have no such privilege.
How to classify the provision of a wedding cake is debatable and it
divides the Justices. In most of the opinions, we have no clear distinctions
concerning proper treatment between what Phillips was asked to do and
the provision of the same ordinary cake supplied for other weddings.
How should supplying an ordinary wedding cake be viewed? One might
say a cake is so central for a wedding celebration that providing it is a
kind of participation that should not be required. This indeed is a position
underlying a concurrence by Justice Gorsuch.41 But, suppose the cake it-
self has no message on it? The fact that it is critical to the celebration
should not itself be enough to warrant refusal to provide. A helpful com-
parison here is with wedding rings. They are a crucial symbol for the mar-
riage itself. But we would not expect a seller of rings to deny a purchase
for someone about to enter a same-sex marriage. If a cake has no special
message on it, should it be different? My inclination is “no,” although
Justice Gorsuch suggests otherwise.
For this particular situation, two considerations are relevant. The opin-
ions refer to a set of three cases in which the sellers of cakes refused to
provide ones with explicit antigay messages. All the Justices accepted the
determination that bakers should not have to print on their cakes explicit
messages to which they have strong objections.42 Although at least one
opinion in Masterpiece Cakeshop sees it as no different from the cases
with the explicit messages that were actually at odds with anti-discrimina-
tion principles,43 being required to convey a definite message one finds
directly offensive is quite different from simply selling an ordinary cake.
38. See Greenawalt, supra note 35, at 107–10.
39. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1728–29; id. at 1739 (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring).
40. See id. at 1727 (majority opinion).
41. Id. at 1738 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
42. See, e.g., id. at 1733 (Kagan, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 1735–36 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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Most of the opinions in the case do not seem to treat what Phillips does
as different from providing an ordinary cake for a same-sex couple. Jus-
tice Thomas provides a more complex perspective.44 He notes that Phil-
lips prescribes himself as an artist. “Phillips takes exceptional care with
each cake that he creates—sketching the design out on paper, choosing
the color scheme, creating the frosting and decorations, baking and
sculpting the cake, decorating it, and delivering it to the wedding.”45 Phil-
lips discusses these matters with a couple before their wedding and, with
some frequency, he stays and interacts with guests of the weddings. All
this amounts to more direct involvement in the wedding than simply pro-
viding a standard cake. If one accepts a basic distinction between direct
involvement and peripheral contact and believes a privilege to refuse
should depend on direct participation, this fuller account of how Phillips
operates really places him on the edge, hard to classify.
Another subject the opinions in the case touch on is how free speech
plays in all this. The opinion of Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gor-
such, explores this in some depth.46 He explains that behavior meant to
be communicative, such as parades, can qualify as protected speech and
that refusing to provide this cake fell into that category.47 Thus, what was
involved for Phillips was an overlap of free exercise and freedom of
speech. Justice Thomas does not delve into whether the degree of protec-
tion is precisely the same in all circumstances, but he seems to assume
that, in settings like this one, the free speech concerns carry the same
kind of power as those based on free exercise.
When one reads the opinions in this case, one sees the complexities of
many of the subjects covered in this article, and that leads to uncertainty
about how some specific instances will be treated in the future and how
they should be resolved.
44. Id. at 1740 (Thomas, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 1742.
46. See id. at 1740–48.
47. Id. at 1741–43.
